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A NEW METAPHOR: HOW ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE LINKS LEGAL REASONING
AND MATHEMATICAL THINKING
MELISSA E. LOVE KOENIG* AND COLLEEN MANDELL**
The lessons of mathematics are simple ones and there are no
numbers in them: that there is structure in this world; that we
can hope to understand some of it and not just gape at what
our senses present to us; that our intuition is stronger with a
formal exoskeleton than without one. And that mathematical
certainty is one thing, the softer convictions we find attached
to us in everyday life another, and we should keep track of the
difference if we can.1
Artificial intelligence’s (AI’s) impact on the legal community expands
exponentially each year. As AI advances, lawyers have more powerful tools to
enhance their ability to research and analyze the law, as well as to draft
contracts and other legal documents. Lawyers are already using tools powered
by AI and are learning to shift their methodologies to take advantage of these
enhancements. To continue to grow into their shifting role, lawyers should
understand the relationship between AI, mathematics, and legal reasoning.
In the realm of law and rhetoric, mathematics has traditionally been used
as a metaphor for the idea that formal logical reasoning is at odds with legal
analysis. Specifically, in this conventional metaphor, mathematics has been
viewed as separate from legal reasoning, because mathematical logic does not
consider the human aspects of law such as public policy and custom. And yet,
the application of AI, with its underlying mathematical algorithms, presents a
paradox, because AI demonstrates that mathematical models do work in
tandem with legal reasoning, research, and drafting. Mathematical reasoning
is an analog to legal reasoning, exemplified by the very fact that AI can
* Melissa Love Koenig is a Professor of Legal Writing at Marquette University Law School,
who deeply thanks her family for inspiring her work on this topic. The authors wish to thank Michael
Kiener for his research support on the theories and writing of Chaïm Perelman and Lucie OlbrechtsTyteca, as well as Crawford Campbell for his research support on Kurt Gödel.
** Colleen Mandell is a Law Clerk in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Kansas.
1. JORDAN ELLENBERG, HOW NOT TO BE WRONG: THE POWER OF MATHEMATICAL THINKING
437 (2014).
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replicate legal research, some aspects of legal reasoning, and even contract
drafting. Therefore, we need a new metaphor, one where mathematics
represents a standard of rigorous and precise thinking.
The connection between AI and the law may seem contrary to traditional
notions that math is incompatible with the law. But this is not to suggest that
scholars and legal thinkers have been wrong; the law is not equivalent to
mathematics. Rather, this Article suggests that mathematics can complement
legal thinking, just as social science can inform public policy arguments. An
adept mathematician possesses strong logical reasoning, understanding the
structure of an idea such that they can develop principles that remain true even
if the structural components change. Logical reasoning is not the end goal of
legal reasoning, but it is a crucial component. A lawyer must employ rigorous
and precise thinking to test the logic of an argument, just like a mathematician.
Furthermore, as AI comes into the forefront of lawyering, a lawyer who
understands mathematical thinking will be empowered to harness the power of
AI as a legal tool in an ever-advancing world.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The legal field’s relationship to mathematics resembles that of a child being
asked to eat all the veggies on their plate—no one wants to take a bite. This
seemingly widespread acceptance of the narrative that lawyers are bad at math
can be seen from law students’ reactions to the mere thought of calculating
damages in a first-year civil procedure course to those of well-known legal
thinkers. The “in” joke is that we are all bad at math, and we became lawyers
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because we are bad at math.2 Even Chief Justice John Roberts joked, “I think
there are a lot of people who go to law school because they’re not good at math
and can’t think of anything else to do.”3 Or take, for example, Former First
Lady Michelle Obama’s remark, “I know for me, I’m a lawyer because I was
bad at [math and science]. All lawyers in the room, you know it’s true. We
can’t add and subtract, so we argue.”4 The legal profession widely accepts the
assumption that lawyers cannot do math. This assumption points to lawyers’
underlying belief that they very rarely need to engage in mathematical thinking.
Despite the belief that lawyers rarely engage in mathematical thinking, a
powerful connection, in fact, exists between legal reasoning and mathematical
thinking, as well as lawyers’ ability to think mathematically, which refers to
numeracy.5 Studies in numeracy, “the ability to understand and use numbers,”
have revealed that (1) mathematical thinking impacts a lawyer’s ability to
conduct substantive legal analysis, and (2) lawyers and “law students are
surprisingly good at math.”6 Such findings demonstrate the need to think of
mathematical reasoning beyond mere arithmetic, and instead to view it as the

2. “Lawyers bond openly over their distaste for math and accept the same in others. Those who
are competent at—or even enjoy—math are seen as an oddity. Only occasionally is the profession’s
math paralysis criticized or even questioned.” Lisa Milot, Illuminating Innumeracy, 63 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 769, 771 (2013). See also Elie Mystal, Law Practice: For Rich Kids Who Don’t Like Math,
ABOVE THE L. (Mar. 25, 2014, 5:47 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2014/03/law-practice-for-richkids-who-dont-like-math/ [https://perma.cc/5W35-DU73 ] (stating in its opening that, “I think we’ve
known for a long time that law is a refuge for people afraid of numbers”); Arden Rowell & Jessica
Bregant, Numeracy and Legal Decision Making, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 192, 193 (2014) (“Law professors,
judges, law students, and attorneys themselves routinely assume that lawyers are bad at math. The
assumption is so pervasive and casual that it has become a sort of in-group lawyer joke that attorneys
tell to each other.”).
3. Rice University, Centennial Lecture Series: Chief Justice John Roberts Speaks at Rice
University, YOUTUBE, at 13:59 (Oct. 26, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UxaFhJ8JVq8
[https://perma.cc/4CAJ-UXQJ].
4. Michelle Obama, Remarks by the First Lady at the National Science Foundation FamilyFriendly Policy Rollout (Sept. 26, 2011), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-thefirst-lady-the-national-science-foundation-family-friendly-policy-rollout
[https://perma.cc/7HESNTYC].
5. Some scholars have noted that a judge’s work is strikingly similar to that of a mathematician.
Both the judge and the mathematician reach their conclusions and then hide that fact through wellreasoned writing and creative illumination. Kevin W. Saunders, Realism, Ratiocination, and Rules, 46
OKLA. L. REV. 219, 225 (1993).
6. Phil Ciciora, Research: Poor Math Skills Affect Legal Decision-Making, ILL. NEWS BUREAU
(Apr. 3, 2013), https://news.illinois.edu/view/6367/204846 [https://perma.cc/XF8Y-MVFW]; Rowell
& Bregant, supra note 2, at 226.
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ability to come to final decisions based on evaluating probabilities, risks, or
calculations.7
Notwithstanding lawyers’ aversity to math are ongoing, AI’s presence and
impact on the legal community continues to expand.8 For example, companies
such as Blue J Legal9 have developed programs that are able to take basic legal
facts and generate a probability of success on the merits along with a legal
memorandum explaining the background law.10 As AI’s capability grows,
lawyers will have more powerful tools to enhance their ability to perform
research and analysis. A lawyer’s abilities to research, counsel, and persuade
are already enhanced by current AI tools, and lawyers are learning to shift their
methodologies to take advantage of these enhancements.11
These developments in AI are fueled by mathematical logic.12 Mathematics
fuels AI through disciplines like linear algebra, calculus, and statistics.13 An
adept mathematician possesses strong logical reasoning, understanding the
structure of an idea such that they can develop principles that remain true even
if the structural components change.14

7. Ciciora, supra note 6. See also MIND Research Institute, Re-imagining Storytelling to
Connect
Math,
Games,
and
History,
YOUTUBE
(July
3,
2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RXCrsE0PIX0 [https://perma.cc/H9JE-CE22] (arguing that our
poor relationship to mathematics is impacting our learning as a whole and proposes storytelling as a
solution to increase students’ engagement in learning mathematical concepts).
8. Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, How Artificial Intelligence Will Affect
the Practice of Law, 68 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J. 106, 121–22 (2018); Sean Semmler & Zeeve Rose,
Artificial Intelligence: Application Today and Implications Tomorrow, 16 DUKE L. TECH. REV. 85,
87–89 (2017).
9. Blue J Legal described its functionality as “the only solution that combines the power of
machine learning and AI with expert understanding of legal factors.”
BLUE J,
https://www.bluej.com/ca [https://perma.cc/M7ZQ-574U]. The way Blue J Legal uses machine
learning to analyze and predict answers to legal questions in tax and employment law is described in
Alarie, Niblet & Yoon, supra note 8, at 119. See also Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett & Albert H.
Yoon, Using Machine Learning to Predict Outcomes in Tax Law 7–8 (2017) (unpublished article),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2855977 [https://perma.cc/9EKP-W89W].
10. Alarie, Niblet & Yoon, supra note 9, at 12. Alexsei is another tool that is described on its
website as using AI to provide “high-quality answers to legal questions in memo format.” ALEXSEI,
https://www.alexsei.com/ [https://perma.cc/BAR2-CSPZ].
11. JOANNA GOODMAN, ROBOTS IN LAW: HOW ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS TRANSFORMING
LEGAL SERVICES 3 (2016). Richard Susskind discusses the need for lawyers to consider their role to
“work in the interests of society” when integrating legal technology into their practice. RICHARD
SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE 195 (2d ed. 2017).
12. Shafi, AI & Mathematics, MEDIUM (Sept. 29, 2020), https://medium.com/swlh/aimathematics-699a9ea2a0d6 [https://perma.cc/N5PN-JJXN].
13. Id.
14. See ELLENBERG, supra note 1, at 12–14.
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To continue to grow into their shifting role as technology users, lawyers
should understand how AI and the underlying mathematics work. The
application of AI demonstrates that mathematical models do work in terms of
legal research to assess legal outcomes. The connection between AI and law
may seem contrary to traditional notions that math is incompatible with law.
However, this Article does not suggest that scholars and legal thinkers
incorrectly argued that the law is not equivalent to mathematics. Rather, this
Article suggests that mathematics can complement legal thinking, just as social
science can inform public policy arguments.
As AI comes further into the forefront of lawyering, a lawyer who
understands mathematical thinking can use mathematics to inform their legal
skills. Understanding mathematics and its principles empowers lawyers to
harness AI’s power as a legal tool in an ever-advancing world. Lawyers need
to understand the bridge between legal reasoning and math. This bridge is
demonstrated by the mathematical algorithms used in AI.15
This Article will proceed in four parts. In Part I, we describe the traditional
narrative that math and the law are incompatible. We explore Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s metaphor of mathematics, which he used to convey the idea that law
cannot be strictly viewed in terms of logic. We discuss philosophers Chaïm
Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s distinctions between mathematical
thinking and argumentation, and we assess patent law’s view that mathematical
innovations are discoveries, not inventions. In Part II, we posit that we need a
new mathematical metaphor, one that advances the use of logic in critical
thinking about the law, while weaving in policy-based arguments and
customary arguments.
Part III presents a primer on math for lawyers. Part IV discusses how to
integrate mathematical thinking and legal reasoning and communication. In
this part we assess how mathematical logic compares to legal reasoning. We
also consider the relationship between mathematics, legal reasoning, and AI.
AI can research the law and even analyze how the law applies to a client’s facts,
in some instances. AI tools are even capable of drafting some contracts and
legal memoranda. Since AI is based on mathematical algorithms that drive the
legal research and analysis, we argue that lawyers have a greater need to
understand the practical realities of the analogs between mathematical
reasoning and legal reasoning. In the Recommendations and Conclusion
Section, we consider ways logical reasoning can be taught in law schools and
used by attorneys and other legal professionals to strengthen their arguments.
15. KATHERINE B. FORREST, WHEN MACHINES CAN BE JUDGE, JURY, AND EXECUTIONER:
JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 12 (2021) (describing algorithms as the “building
blocks” of AI).
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II. TRADITIONAL NARRATIVES THAT MATH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH LAW
In his essay, “The Resilience of Law,” Joseph Vining poignantly describes
his reaction to his father’s attempt to quantify the law and economics.16 His
father, Rutledge Vining, created a symbolic notation for determining the
statistical effect of legislation on the economy.17 Vining, while proud of his
father, could not bring himself to review his father’s work in creating symbols
and equations to assess legislation that would affect the economy.18 He could
not do so, he recounts, because “[l]aws might have systematic qualities but law
was alive in a way rules that make a system are not.”19 Vining’s story illustrates
the traditional perception of a strict divide between the law and forms of
thinking that use symbolism or mathematics.
Aristotle’s writing is the first to have described deductive reasoning, which
applies to geometry, but he saw a difference between mathematical reasoning
and human rhetoric and argumentation.20 Aristotle distinguishes, for instance,
the wisdom of a person who understands the abstraction of mathematics and
geometry, which pertains to the universal, from a person who has the wisdom
of human experience, which addresses the particular.21 Aristotle also
differentiates mathematical arguments, which he states do not involve choice,
from arguments about people, which bear on their character, as demonstrated
by the choices they make.22 This narrative has continued in the debate between
16. Joseph Vining, The Resilience of Law, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE
151–52 (H.J. Powell & J.B. White eds., 2009).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 152.
19. Id.
20. Brian Larson, Endogenous and Dangerous, 22 NEV. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at
4).
21. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, at 98–99 (W.D. Ross trans., Batoche Books ed.
1999) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“What has been said is confirmed by the fact that while young men become
geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it is thought that a young man of
practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals
but with particulars, which become familiar from experience, but a young man has no experience, for
it is length of time that gives experience; indeed one might ask this question too, why a boy may
become a mathematician, but not a philosopher or a physicist. It is because the objects of mathematics
exist by abstraction, while the first principles of these other subjects come from experience, and
because young men have no conviction about the latter but merely use the proper language, while the
essence of mathematical objects is plain enough to them?”).
22. ARISTOTLE, ART OF RHETORIC bk. III, at 201 (Robert C. Bartlett trans., The Univ. of Chicago
Press ed. 2019) (“The narration also ought to bear on [moral] character. This will be the case if we
know what fosters [a sense of one’s] character. Now, one thing is to make clear the choice involved;
and the sort of character one has relates to the sort of choices one makes, and the sort of choice one
makes is related to one’s end or goal. It is for this reason that mathematical arguments do not involve
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Christopher Columbus Langdell and Oliver Wendell Holmes over legal
formalism.23 Further, it has been witnessed in the modern work of Chaïm
Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric,24 and it appears in
the approach taken in patent law cases to assess the patentability of
mathematics. The common theme weaving through these narratives is that
human argumentation cannot be reduced to mathematical abstraction or formal
logic.
A. The Langdell-Holmes Debate
The relationship between mathematical thinking and legal reasoning
appears in the debate between Christopher Columbus Langdell, dean of
Harvard Law School, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Justice of the Supreme
Court and also professor at Harvard during Langdell’s tenure as dean.25 The
debate centered on whether law is a science capable, as Langdell asserted, of
being uncovered by reading cases and applied through formal logic to a new
case.26 Holmes uses the metaphor of mathematics to express his concern that
law should not be reduced to mere logic.27 This metaphor allows Holmes to
argue, as an analog, why law is not a science.
As a legal formalist, Langdell viewed law as a science.28 He described law
as a “legal truth” to be discovered, and he compared the printed books in law

matters of character, because they do not involve choice either (since they do not have the ‘for the sake
of which’ [or end]), whereas Socratic arguments do, since they speak about such things.”).
23. Stephen R. Alton, Roll Over Langdell, Tell Llewellyn the News: A Brief History of American
Legal Education, 35 OKLA. CITY UNIV. L. REV. 339, 355 (2010).
24. See generally CHAÏM PERELMAN & LUCIE OBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A
TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., Notre Dame Press 1969)
(originally published as LA NOUVELLE RHETORIQUE: TRAITE DE L’ARGUMENTATION (Presses
Universitaires de France 1958)).
25. Susan Haack, On Logic in the Law: “Something, But Not All”, 20 RATIO JURIS 1, 1 (Mar.
2007) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881)).
26. Alton, supra note 23, at 346–48. See also Haack, supra note 25, at 6 (referring to an afterdinner speech by Langdell titled “Teaching Law as a Science,” which he gave after Holmes’s Path of
the Law speech).
27. Alton, supra note 23, at 353 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW
1 (1881)).
28. Id. at 346. See also Todd E. Pettys, The Analytic Classroom, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1255, 1263
(2012) (quoting C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vi-vii
(1871)); Haack, supra note 25, at 3; David S. Romantz, The Truth About Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing
Courses and the Legal Writing Curriculum, 52 KAN. L. REV. 105, 115 (2003) (noting the case method
was a way for students to “objectively and rationally discover the law by isolating and analyzing legal
doctrines found in judicial opinions”); Richard Neumann, Osler, Langdell & the Atelier: Three Tales
of Creation in Professional Education, 10 J. LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 151, 166–71 (2013)
(describing Langdell’s teaching methods).
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libraries to the laboratories used in the hard sciences.29 These comparisons
motivated Langdell to secure the place of law as a distinct discipline and
graduate course of study.30 Langdell thought that legal truths were limited in
number and could be ascertained by reading cases.31 Langdell believed these
legal truths, as rules of law, could then be applied to a new set of facts, as
syllogistic reasoning.32
Holmes disagreed with Langdell for reducing the law to formal logic.
Generally, Holmes criticized Langdell for ignoring the moral and political
forces and public policy that also play a role in judicial decisions and jury
verdicts.33 Holmes has been often quoted as saying:
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.
The seed of every new growth within its sphere has been a felt
necessity. The form of continuity has been kept up by
reasonings purporting to reduce everything to a logical
sequence; but that form is nothing but the evening dress which
the newcomer puts on to make itself presentable according to
the conventional requirements. The important phenomenon is
the man underneath it, not the coat; the justice and
reasonableness of the decision, not its consistency with
previously held views [ . . . ]. The law finds its philosophy not
in self-consistency, which must always fail so long as it
continues to grow, but in history and the nature of human
needs. As a branch of anthropology, law is an object of
science; the theory of legislation is a scientific study; but the
effort to reduce the concrete details of an existing system to the
merely logical consequence of simple postulates is always in
danger of becoming unscientific, and of leading to a
misapprehension of the nature of the problem and the data.34
In other words, Holmes sees law as reflecting the human condition in all its
messiness, as opposed to mere postulates and theorems. Holmes uses the
metaphor of the evening dress to suggest that logical argumentation is a way to
29. Alton, supra note 23, at 347 (quoting Christopher C. Langdell, Dane Professor, Harvard Law
Sch., Address to Harvard Law School Association at the “Quarter Millennial” Celebration of Harvard
University (Nov. 5, 1886), in The Harvard Law School, 3 L.Q. REV. 188, 124 (1887)).
30. Id. at 350.
31. Id. at 347.
32. See id. (noting that according to Langdell, “[i]f one found one of these few legal truths and
applied it scientifically to the case at hand, the legal result should be virtually automatic and
invariable”).
33. Id. at 353; Haack, supra note 25, at 5.
34. E.g., Haack, supra note 25, at 4 (quoting HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 234 (1880)).
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beautify an argument, but it is not the argument itself. He suggests that a sound
argument must be something more than correctly reasoned—it must be just.
Holmes elaborated on these points in his address at the dedication of the
new hall at the Boston University School of Law in 1897.35 Titled “The Path
of the Law,” Holmes spoke of the study of law as the study of a profession.36
Law is a profession, he said, because people pay lawyers to represent them
knowing that the power of the state is behind a judge’s decision, and a lawyer
must predict “the incidence of that public force through the instrumentality of
the courts.”37 In considering how law grows and develops, Holmes took the
stance that it would be a “fallacy” to posit that “the only force at work in the
development of the law is logic.”38 He admitted that “in the broadest sense that
notion would be true,” but remarked that:
The postulate on which we think about the universe is that there
is a fixed quantitative relation between every phenomenon and
its antecedents and consequents. If there is such a thing as a
phenomenon without these fixed quantitative relations, it is a
miracle. It is outside the law of cause and effect, and as such
transcends our power of thought, or at least is something to or
from which we cannot reason. The condition of our thinking
about the universe is that it is capable of being thought about
rationally, or, in other words, that every part of it is effect and
cause in the same sense in which those parts are with which we
are most familiar. So in the broadest sense it is true that the
law is a logical development, like everything else. The danger
of which I speak is not the admission that the principles
governing other phenomena also govern the law, but the notion
that a given system, ours, for instance, can be worked out like
mathematics from some general axioms of conduct.39
In this last sentence, Holmes seems to be speaking directly to Langdell’s
view that the law is governed by a limited number of fundamental legal truths.40
Here, Holmes uses mathematics as a metaphor for overly simplistic
argumentation and analysis.

35. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897), reprinted in
The Path of the Law After 100 Years, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991 (1997).
36. Id. at 991.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 997.
39. Id. at 997–98.
40. See Haack, supra note 25, at 5.
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Holmes also employs the metaphor of mathematics to reject formulaic
reasoning and structure of arguments:
The training of lawyers is a training in logic. The processes of
analogy, discrimination, and deduction are those in which they
are most at home. The language of judicial decision is mainly
the language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter
that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every
human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is
not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment
as to the relative worth and importance of competing
legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious
judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole
proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form.41
Holmes recognizes the value of using logic in both a lawyer’s arguments
and a judge’s decision. He again suggests in this passage that a logical form,
as used by a lawyer or a judge, creates a sense of certainty that does not truly
reflect the tug-of-war of the underlying policies supporting each party’s
contentions. Holmes acknowledges that sometimes those competing interests
are not even part of our consciousness.
Holmes’s metaphor that law is not mathematics focuses on the idea that
legal reasoning must be based on practical and sound judgment, considering the
public force that Holmes argued underlies our system of law. Certainly,
lawyers use traditional forms of logic, but that logic must be supported by a
rationale that accounts for social customs and public policy.
B. The View of Philosophy and Rhetoric
Philosophers and rhetoricians have also pondered the relationship between
logic, mathematics, and legal reasoning.42 Philosophers Chaïm Perelman and
Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca undertook the study of the logic of non-formal

41. Holmes, supra note 35, at 998.
42. Chaïm Perelman and Stephen E. Toulmin are examples of modern scholars who have
considered this question. E.g., STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT, at xi (Updated ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2003). This Article focuses on Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The
New Rhetoric. In his essay, “What the Philosopher May Learn from the Study of Law,” Perelman
argued that philosophers should look to law, instead of mathematics or science. Francis J. Mootz III,
Right Rhetoric: What Lawyers May Learn From the Study of Rhetoric, in LIBER AMICORUM DE GUY
HAARSCHER,QU’EST-CE QUE LA PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT? (Free Univ. of Brussels 2013) (noting
Perelman advocated that philosophers can “look to legal practice and its practical attention to concrete
problems that cannot be resolved by applying an algorithm”).
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arguments.43 They applied rhetorical theory to the logic of non-formal
arguments in their 1958 work, The New Rhetoric.44 The aim of argumentation,
they state, is to secure “the adherence of those to whom it is addressed” and,
therefore, “it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced.”45
Similar to Holmes’s mathematics metaphor, Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca use mathematics in The New Rhetoric to illustrate how argumentation
is different from formal logic. They begin by observing that under
mathematicians’ influence, logic has come to mean formal logic, which they
defined as “the methods of proof used in the mathematical sciences.”46 As such,
they posit, any reasoning that does not fall under formal logic “elude[s]
reason.”47 The study of methods of proof in logic do not “venture to examine
the proofs used in human sciences.”48 While Holmes had asserted that legal
argument could not be reduced to mere formal logic, Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca now were observing that logic had come to mean purely formal logic,
without consideration for other forms of proof.49 Moreover, logic had become,
under the influence of mathematics, symbolic and “no longer related to any
rational evidence whatsoever.”50
The best place to convey the unique characteristics of argumentation,
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note, is to contrast it with the classical concept
of demonstration.51 The modern logician, relying on mathematical reasoning,
is “free to fix the symbols and combinations of symbols that may be used.”52
A logician must only choose “symbols and rules in such a way as to avoid doubt
and ambiguity.”53 The origin of axioms and rules of deductive reasoning “goes
beyond the framework of the formalism in question.”54 Accordingly, the

43. PERELMAN & OBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 24, at 142. Perelman undertook the work of
developing the theories, and Obrechts-Tyteca created the examples. David A. Frank & Michelle
Bolduc, Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric, 96 Q. J. OF SPEECH 141, 141–42 (2010).
44. PERLEMAN & OBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 24, at 142.
45. Id. at 19.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. In the last century, “[m]odern formal logic became, in this way, the study of the methods of
demonstration used in the mathematical sciences.” Id. at 10. Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca analyzed
arguments from other sources in the “human sciences, law and philosophy” to create their theory of
argumentation. Id. at 9.
50. Id. at 13.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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meaning and interpretation of the “axiomatic system” is not questioned, and a
logician need only be concerned with the “adequacy for the end pursued.”55
In contrast, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain, in argumentation,
when people use “discourse to influence the intensity of an audience’s
adherence to certain theses, it is no longer possible to neglect completely, as
irrelevancies, the psychological and social conditions in the absence of which
argumentation would be pointless and without result.”56 Argumentation
requires “an effective community of minds,” and that intellectual community
must agree to debate a question.57 Accordingly, Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca’s work to define these concepts shows that they view argumentation,
and by extension, legal argument, as more complicated and expansive than
formal logic or mathematics.
C. An Example from Patent Law
In keeping with the traditional notions advanced by thinkers such as
Aristotle, Holmes, and Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca, the legal field has been
reticent to recognize, if not downright critical of, the idea that mathematics and
law are compatible fields. This discord between mathematical and legal
thought may be seen in patent law. Patent law is an example of one area of law,
among many, that embodies the notion that mathematics and law cannot be
compared.
Patent case law continually denies protection to mathematical theories and
expression on the basis that math is a discovered truth, not a created invention.58
In focusing on this dichotomy between discovered truth and created invention,
patent law exemplifies the legal community’s tendency to ignore the
similarities between mathematics and law. Patent law exemplifies this
tendency because it ignores the inventive and creative nature of mathematical
problem solving. The dichotomy between discovered truth and created
55. Id. at 14.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. To understand the underpinnings of the viewpoint that math is a discovered truth as opposed
to a created invention, it is useful to have a precise definition for what is an invention is and what is a
discovery. An invention, at large, may be viewed as technology that solves a specific problem. What
is an Invention, IGE IPI, https://www.ige.ch/en/protecting-your-ip/patents/patent-basics/what-is-aninvention [https://perma.cc/N7AR-5Y8W]. A discovery, on the other hand, uncovers an existing truth
that was previously unknown. JACQUES HADAMARD, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVENTION IN THE
MATHEMATICAL FIELD, at xi (1945). The distinction between an invention and discovery then can be
thought of using this comparison: “Columbus discovered America: it existed before him; on the
contrary, Franklin invented the lighting rod: before him there had never been any lighting rod.” Id.
So, the distinction between invention and discovery is between finding truth and creating something
new from existing truths.
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invention demonstrates how patent law creates norms that separate the fields of
mathematics and law. Patent law’s focus on this dichotomy reinforces the
differences between the two fields such that it becomes harder to shed light on
the commonalities that they share.
First and foremost, patent law protection extends to any created invention,
not a discovered truth. Specifically, patent law may protect any person who
“invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,” subject to
conditions and requirements.59 In interpreting this statute, courts have limited
patentable subject matter to exclude “the laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas.”60 These exclusions extend to mathematics as “an abstract
idea . . . and a law of nature.”61 For example, in Gottschalk v. Benson, the
United States Supreme Court held mathematical algorithms in software are not
patentable subject matter because “[p]henomena of nature . . . mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts” cannot be protected.62 In other
words, mathematics cannot be protected by a patent because it is a naturally
occurring truth that is discovered through a mathematician’s reasoning.
Accordingly, patent law, at its foundation, views mathematics as a truth to be
discovered about the world, not a protectable invention.63
In viewing mathematics as a truth to be discovered about the world, the
United States Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr, a seminal decision
determining mathematics is non-patentable subject matter, demonstrated patent
law’s attachment to Platonism.64 Platonism, in the context of patent law, is the
idea that mathematics is discovered more than it is created.65 In refusing to give
patent protection to mathematics, patent law relies upon the idea that math is a
discovered truth as opposed to an invented creation. The Court in Diehr

59. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
60. General
Information
Concerning
Patents,
USPTO,
(2022),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/basics/general-information-patents [https://perma.cc/2L9B-M77G].
61. Appendix 1 to the October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, USPTO (Oct. 2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_app1.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/7KWB-LGHB].
62. 409 U.S. 63, 67, 73 (1972).
63. See Paul B. de Laat, Patenting Mathematical Algorithms: What’s the Harm? A Thought
Experiment in Algebra, 20 INT’L REV. OF L. AND ECON. 187, 188 (2000).
64. See generally 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
65. Alec Wilkinson, What is Mathematics, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 2, 2021),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/what-is-mathematics
[https://perma.cc/Q897AP4W]. Rebecca Goldstein describes a mathematical Platonist as someone who “uses the word ‘true,’
even when applied to mathematical statements, in exactly the same way as we normally use the word,
not as a shorthand for ‘relative to x’ but to represent existing states of affairs.” REBECCA GOLDSTEIN,
INCOMPLETENESS: THE PROOF AND PARADOX OF KURT GÖDEL 87 (2005).
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exemplified this by expanding patent protection to inventions using math, while
continuing to exclude math itself as non-patentable subject matter.66 In Diehr,
the patent application described the invention as the process of constantly
measuring the temperature inside a rubber mold and feeding the measurements
into a computer to calculate the appropriate cure time using a mathematical
equation.67 The patent examiner rejected the claims because the claims were
based on mathematics and computer programming, non-statutory subject
matter.68
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether a
mathematical equation deserved patent protection.69 The Court held that a
process using mathematical truths may be patentable, but the math itself could
not be patented.70 In its view, math is an abstract principle, a fundamental truth,
that cannot be patented because no one person can claim an exclusive right in
it.71 In reasoning that a mathematical formula expresses a law of nature, the
Diehr Court’s rationale embodies the view that math is an inherent truth waiting
to be discovered.
This distinction between truth and invention exemplifies the legal field’s
unwillingness to recognize and understand the inventive critical thinking and
reasoning that mathematics requires, a notion tracing back to early scholars
such as Plato and Aristotle.72 But what if this understanding of math as an
invented truth was not present in legal thinking? Then scholars might begin to
look at the commonalities between the law and mathematics. Removing this
continued lens of mathematics as an invented truth allows for the insight that
mathematics is often a creative field that requires definition and strong logical
reasoning to develop new knowledge.73 In shifting to this new viewpoint, the
similarities between mathematical thinking and reasoning may be further
developed. But as long as the legal field, as illustrated by the area of patent
law, continues to view mathematics only as a truth to be uncovered, it is

66. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–93.
67. Id. at 177–78.
68. Id. at 179–80.
69. Id. at 181.
70. Id. at 184.
71. Id. at 185–90.
72. Wilkinson, supra note 65. Patent law seems to approach math in a similar way to Langdell’s
attempt to create a new science out of law by discovering legal principles that are already in existence
in the natural world.
73. See ELLENBERG, supra note 1, at 12–13. Mathematics is an inherently creative field.
Mathematical creativity seeks to uncover patterns, just as all human fields seek to uncover patterns like
in the Bible or in counting sheep.
Maths and Storytelling, BBC RADIO (1999),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0054625 [https://perma.cc/4KHN-THNV].
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impossible to engage in an interdisciplinary approach that allows mathematical
thinking to inform and strengthen legal analysis.
This brief overview of patentable subject matter highlights how patent law,
as a modern legal trend, continues traditional thinkers’ views that mathematics
is incompatible with the law. Patent law exemplifies the legal field’s position
that mathematics is an inherent truth of the world waiting to be discovered,
instead of seeing the possibility of mathematics as a created invention requiring
intensive reasoning just as the law does.
III. LAWYERS SHOULD NOT FEAR MATHEMATICS
Despite a storied history of thinkers opposing the idea that mathematics and
law are compatible, we posit that mathematical reasoning can inform legal
analysis. Holmes’s criticism of Langdell hinges upon Langdell’s reduction of
law to a solely logic-based form with a limited number of legal principles that
act as legal truths. In response to Langdell, Holmes rightly viewed law as more
than simple logical axioms and postulates. In Holmes’s view, law draws upon
public policy and other sources to address society’s needs. Holmes, like
Aristotle and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, recognized that law is reflected
through logical argument and that mathematics is a metaphor for formulaic
thinking.
As these thinkers have aptly grasped, mathematics and law are not directly
comparable. The two fields are not one and the same. Mathematical reasoning
is often confined to the realm of numbers, while legal analysis grapples with a
broad array of statutes, case law, and policy shaped by history and power.
However, an interdisciplinary approach to understand the law through the
lens of math improves how we, as lawyers, communicate the law to our clients,
to judges, to the public at large, and to each other. This approach responds to
Holmes’s viewpoint that mathematics is a metaphor for formulaic thinking by
demonstrating that math is a form of problem solving that uses a myriad of
techniques to creatively solve problems. In understanding the two fields’
commonalities of deductive reasoning and straightforward communication,
lawyers can sharpen their legal analysis and improve how they communicate
legal analysis. By comprehending the differences between law and math,
lawyers can harness the power of what makes law its own distinct field. For
example, by grasping the breadth of material and different avenues legal
analysis can take compared to mathematical reasoning, a lawyer can better
choose the appropriate method and channel that method more competently.
Further, while lawyers might think differently from mathematicians, we should
appreciate the rigor of the approach mathematicians take in proofs and linear
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thinking. Lawyers need to be able to spot logical fallacies and apply a rigorous
approach to develop more precise legal reasoning.
As a profession, we as lawyers, have clung too tightly to Holmes’s
metaphor of mathematics as strictly formulaic thinking at the risk of ignoring
the importance of logic. As lawyers, we use straightforward logical thinking in
both writing and thinking about the law. While we also rely upon other forms
of argument, we should not forget about logic and, in fact, we should pay more
attention to it. Logic is an essential element in our reasoning that has been
largely lost in the law school curriculum.74 In defining our discipline and
profession, we should not seek to shun math as a metaphor. Instead, we should
embrace mathematics as an analog, not as a methodology to apply directly to
law. Such a notion requires that we better understand the basis of logic and
reasoning to improve the quality of our analysis and argument. In re-imagining
Holmes’s idea of math as a metaphor for formulaic thinking, the new metaphor
should be that math is analogous to law, which requires lawyers to be more
precise in their use of legal logic.
This discussion does not contemplate every form of logic, nor does it seek
to limit the mathematical field to what is discussed in these pages. These are
complex fields that have been studied by great thinkers dating back many
centuries. Rather, this Article seeks to open a dialogue about how we can
improve legal analysis by looking to other fields’ work, specifically by focusing
on how mathematics can inform and improve legal reasoning.
In re-imagining Holmes’s work and embracing the new metaphor of math
as analogous to law, we see that AI demonstrates the viability of this new
metaphor. The reality is that AI uses mathematical algorithms to research the
law, analyze the law, and write about the law in both contract drafting and
memos.75 Theorists have even contemplated using AI in judicial decision
making.76 AI is moving to the forefront of legal tools, and, with it, the
importance of mathematical logic must be reconsidered in relation to legal
reasoning. Moreover, lawyers who understand that they must be able to deliver
more than the basic skills AI covers, will be the ones to thrive in the practice of
law.77 To that end, while we appreciate Holmes’s point that mathematics can
74. Barbara A. Kalinowski, Logic Ab Initio: A Functional Approach to Improve Law Students'
Critical Thinking Skills, 22 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 109, 110–11 (2018).
75. Chris Chambers Goodman, AI/Esq.: Impacts of Artificial Intelligence in Lawyer-Client
Relationships, 72 OKLA. L. Rᴇᴠ. 149, 154 (2019).
76. Id. at 152.
77. SUSSKIND, supra note 11, at 188 (predicting that lawyers will face competition from
machines and that “[t]he best and the brightest human professionals will last the longest—those experts
who will perform tasks that cannot or should not be replaced by machines”). Susskind suggests that
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represent formulaic thinking, it is at tension with the current reality that legal
tools rely heavily upon mathematical logic. As AI tools are being developed,
lawyers need to understand mathematical logic to fully embrace these tools.
But in adopting the new metaphor that embraces mathematical logic, we should
not lose sight of Holmes’s point that law is a human endeavor with customs,
policy, and sound judgment underlying it. Rather, the new metaphor of math
as analogous to law emphasizes the importance of a strong foundation in logic,
while we as lawyers continue to use all available tools of good lawyering—
especially those such as empathy that make us human.78 The arguments we
build of customs, policy, and sound judgment will be that much stronger when
we build them upon the strong foundation of logic informed by mathematical
reasoning.
IV. A PRIMER ON MATHEMATICS
Defining mathematics is tricky—even “mathematicians [who] know what
mathematics is . . . have difficulty saying it.”79 Often, when we think of
mathematics, we think of the core subjects taught in primary and secondary
school that follow basic arithmetic: algebra, trigonometry, calculus, linear
algebra.80 However, the discipline extends far beyond the climb up the calculus
mountain. Life after calculus includes complex and real analysis, linear
algebra, combinatorics, geometry, topology, probability and statistics, and
mathematical logic.81 Math goes beyond the merely computational discipline

lawyers can offer value through their “knowledge, expertise, experience, insight, know-how, and
understanding that they can apply in the particular circumstances of their clients’ affairs.” Id. at 189–
90. Lawyers will need to capitalize on these skills to succeed in a more technologically advanced
profession. Id. at 190.
78. Melissa Love Koenig, Jule A. Oseid & Amy Vorenberg, OK, Google, Will Artificial
Intelligence Replace Human Lawyering, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 1269, 1302–03 (2019).
79. Wilkinson, supra note 65; Gunter M. Ziegler & Andreas Loos, “What is Mathematics?” And
Why We Should Ask, Where One Should Experience and Learn That, And How to Teach It, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON MATHEMATICAL EDUCATION 75 (G.
Kaiser ed., 2017), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-62597-3_5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NEJ4-ARH3] (discussing the impossibility of defining mathematics as any one thing
that often reflects the person defining the subject, more than the subject itself).
80. Underwood Dudley, What is Mathematics For?, 57 NOTICES OF THE AM. MATHEMATICAL
SOC’Y
608
(May
2010),
https://www.ams.org/notices/201005/rtx100500608p.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QLA9-2REJ].
81. Dep’t of Mathematics, Life After Calculus, CORNELL UNIV., https://math.cornell.edu/lifeafter-calculus [https://perma.cc/EK8Y-UQVM].
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that most are familiar with from early education to a field that proves why those
computational disciplines reach results that are invariably true.82
With all these different topics within the field, it becomes even more
challenging to pin down exactly what math is—or is not. Even within the field,
there are multiple conflicting definitions of math, with some viewing math as a
discovery and others viewing math as a creative invention.83 In defining
mathematics, maybe the clearest place to start is the dictionary.84 MerriamWebster defines mathematics as “the science of numbers and their operations,
interrelations, combinations, generalizations, and abstractions and of space
configurations and their structure, measurement, transformations, and
generalizations.”85 That definition, then, points to mathematics as a systematic,
linear pursuit to understand numbers and their relationship to each other and
the world.
Teaching standards provide insight into what mathematics is, as they
outline the key learning objectives and outcomes that students should gain
through mathematical education. Math is often taught as a way of
understanding the general through the specific, meaning that broad level
concepts and theorems are learned through application and problem solving that
isolates the concept to be learned.86 The National Council of Teachers of
Mathematics breaks math into two categories of standards: thinking and
content.87 The thinking standards seek to build the necessary skills to

82. RICHARD HAMMACK, BOOK OF PROOF, at viii (2d ed. 2013). For example, a major in
mathematics may include study of logic and foundations, analysis, geometry and topology, algebra,
combinatorics, and number theory. See Dep’t of Mathematics, The Mathematics Major, YALE UNIV.
(2022), https://math.yale.edu/undergraduate/mathematics-major [https://perma.cc/6NRP-2NKV].
83. See supra Section II.B. There is an age-old debate about whether math is discovered as a
natural truth of the universe or whether it is created as a tool that solves problems using scientific
principles. See also Dan Falk, What is Math?, THE SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/what-math-180975882/ [https://perma.cc/3NBCJ6KC].
84. This interpretive method follows the textualist approach, which relies upon dictionary usage
as the starting point in an analysis of ambiguous statutory meaning. See generally Phillip A. Rubin,
War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries In Accordance with Textualist Principles, 60
DUKE L.J. 167 (2010), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1474&context=d
lj [https://perma.cc/LLW5-RXXD].
85. Mathematics,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/mathematics?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld
[https://perma.cc/C2CZ-RYMR].
86. See generally NAT’L COUNCIL OF TEACHERS OF MATHEMATICS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
PRINCIPLES
AND
STANDARDS
FOR
SCHOOL
MATHEMATICS
3,
https://www.nctm.org/uploadedFiles/Standards_and_Positions/PSSM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NJ2D-2S3D].
87. Id.
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mathematically reason, which is comprised of problem solving,
communication, reasoning, and connections.88 Content standards outline
specific math topics that students should master to succeed in everyday life.89
The content standards include estimation, number sense or numeracy, geometry
and spatial sense, measurement, statistics and probability, fractions and
decimals, and patterns and relationships.90
The combination of thinking and content standards provides a basis for
students to engage with the material—students who lack an understanding of
content may rely too heavily on procedures.91 The result is that students are
less likely to be able to successfully solve similar problems, justify conclusions,
apply the concepts in real world applications, explain the solution to others, or
deviate from a known procedure to find a faster solution.92 So, in teaching
mathematics, teachers seek to impart both the ability to problem solve through
mathematical reasoning and mastery of everyday mathematical concepts to
further a student’s critical thinking and reasoning skills.
Despite definitional differences within the field, math, at its core, is a type
of problem solving.93 Mathematics is a system of thought where proof lies at
the heart.94 A proof is the process of demonstrating that a theory or concept is,
in fact, true through correct logical argument.95 Mathematics is a way to think
about and analyze problems, not rote memorization of theorems and formulas.96
On the surface, problem solving may seem contradictory to the mathematical
teaching standards of content and thinking. However, the standards seek
content mastery to further develop mathematical reasoning and concrete skills
like balancing a budget to succeed in everyday life. In fact, math can be

88. Id. at 4.
89. Id. at 3–4.
90. Id.
91. Standards for Mathematical Practice, COMMON CORE ST. STANDARDS INITIATIVE,
http://www.corestandards.org/Math/Practice/ [https://perma.cc/A69V-XCHA].
92. Id.
93. D.G.
Moursund,
What
is
Mathematics?,
https://pages.uoregon.edu/moursund/Math/mathematics.htm [https://perma.cc/AFQ5-C3LQ]. George
Johnson, Useful Invention or Absolute Truth: What is Math?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 1998),
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/10/science/useful-invention-or-absolute-truth-what-is-math.html
[https://perma.cc/76TM-6PKD] (discussing conflicting viewpoints of math as a human creation like
literature, religion, or banking and as a discovered truth like the Platonian pi in the sky that seek to
explain the world around us).
94. Kyle
Pratt,
Note,
What
is
Math
Research?,
3
(expository
note),
https://faculty.math.illinois.edu/~kpratt4/what_is_math_research.pdf [https://perma.cc/992Y-6ATY].
95. Id.
96. EDWARD A. BENDER, MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, at xviii
(Jan. 19, 1999), http://math.ucsd.edu/~ebender/ai_front.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WXK-6WLN].
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considered as “a science of not being wrong about things, its techniques and
habits hammered out by centuries of hard work and argument.”97 Math is an
extension of common sense—“a means by which we can reason about the
uncertain, taming if not altogether domesticating it.”98 In other words, a
mathematician can use logical deduction to understand that which is uncertain.
The word “proof” likely evokes an image of high school geometry and two
column proofs.99 While a two-column proof is one stylistic approach to proofs,
most mathematical thinkers organize their proofs in paragraphs.100 Proofs are
used in almost every area of math including complex analysis, real analysis,
linear algebra, and topology.101 For every area of math, a proof backs up the
technique to ensure the technique is true every time it is applied.102 There are
many structures for completing a proof, but three main types are direct proof
(proof by construction), proof by contradiction, and proof by induction.103
A direct proof is a sequence of statements that begins with statements
known to be true and ends with the conclusion seeking to be proved.104 A direct
proof is not the same as deductive reasoning, but rather it is the application of
deductive reasoning to a mathematical problem.105 In a direct proof, the
hypotheses is assumed,106 and the conclusion is achieved through deduction,

97. ELLENBERG, supra note 1, at 2.
98. Id. at 425.
99. Introduction to Proofs, CK-12, https://www.ck12.org/c/geometry/introduction-toproofs/lesson/Two-Column-Proofs-BSC-GEOM/ [https://perma.cc/A9GC-J622].
100. Proofs are the mathematical tool to discover new ideas, confirm their accuracy, and to
understand these ideas. Proofs stand opposite to the concept of storytelling. In teaching and using
proofs, mathematics students learn to intake stories and then challenge those stories, to prove those
stories for themselves. Aslanbek Naziev, Teaching Mathematics: Discovering vs Storytelling, 9
BRAIN: BROAD RSCH IN A.I. AND NEUROSCIENCE 128, 128 (2018). This method is similar to learning
in law school where students are expected to read case law and challenge the resulting holdings that
are to be considered as legal truths.
101. See
Math
Course
Offerings,
S T.
NORBERT
COLL.
(2021),
https://www.snc.edu/math/courseofferings.html [https://perma.cc/LP5R-BEPB].
102. See HAMMACK, supra note 82, at viii.
103. Nissim Lavy, Types of Mathematical Proofs, MEDIUM (Jan. 2, 2017),
https://medium.com/@nissim.lavy/types-of-proofs-c43ffacc8ada [https://perma.cc/A2L9-JH94].
104. PATRICK KEEF & DAVID GUICHARD, AN INTRODUCTION TO HIGHER MATHEMATICS, 36
(Whitman Coll. Dep’t of Mathematics 2021), https://www.whitman.edu/mathematics/higher_math/hi
gher_math.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZSV5-UVTE].
105. See
Viktor
Grigoryan,
Math
320
Proof
(Sept.
2,
2018),
http://web.simmons.edu/~grigorya/320/notes/note2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3EG-MSEZ].
106. See BEVERLY HENDERSON WEST, ELLEN NORMA GRIESBACH, JERRY DUNCAN TAYLOR &
LOUISE TODD TAYLOR, THE PRENTICE-HALL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MATHEMATICS 447–48 (1982).
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reasoning directly from the assumption to the desired conclusion.107 In saying
that we assume the hypotheses, we begin with statements that we already know
to be true. In a classic two-column geometric proof, these are the “givens.”108
The hypotheses can be made up of assumptions or previously proven
statements.109 An assumption is a definition, an axiom, or a postulate that is the
“essential foundation” of a mathematical system.110 If we had not assumed the
truth of these statements at the outset of the problem, we would have to
individually prove them through deduction.111 One example of a direct proof
is to prove the theorem “if p, then q.” The proof would adopt the following
structure:112
Proposition: if P, then Q.
Proof. Assume P.
.
.
.
Therefore Q. QED.

In moving from the assumption to the conclusion, the mathematician uses
deduction to logically prove every statement. As discussed, the proof would
typically be written in paragraph format, where each sentence is a logical link
to the next.113
On the other hand, a proof by contradiction seeks to prove that a statement
is true by demonstrating that the opposite of the statement leads to a false
conclusion.114 Proof by contradiction begins by assuming the statement to be

107. John M. Lee, Math 300 Introduction to Mathematical Reasoning: Proof Templates (Fall
2017),
https://sites.math.washington.edu/~lee/Courses/300-2017/proof-templates.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H9NJ-M9VF].
108. See WEST, GRIESBACH, TAYLOR & TAYLOR, supra note 106, at 447–48.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. HAMMACK, supra note 82, at 92. QED is an abbreviation for the Latin phrase “quod erat
demonstradum,” meaning “that which was to be demonstrated.” It is a notation that is used to
demonstrate the end of a proof. Other common notations include an empty or filled in square. Eric
Weisstein, Q.E.D., WOLFRAM MATHWORLD (2021), https://mathworld.wolfram.com/QED.html
[https://perma.cc/QJW3-5LEM].
113. HAMMACK, supra note 82, at 92.
114. HAMMACK, supra note 82, at 111–12.
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proved is false.115 Then, through deduction, a proof by contradiction reaches a
false result that is not possible.116 That is, the result either contradicts the
original assumption of the proof or something already known to be true. 117 For
example, try to prove the theorem: “P.” A proof by contradiction begins with
assuming “not P.” Using direct reasoning, we proceed until we reach a
contradiction. Thus, “P” must be true. The proof follows the structure
below:118
Proposition: P
Proof. Assume not P.
.
.
.
Therefore P. QED.

Finally, a proof by induction seeks to prove a set of statements are all
true.119 It is a way to prove that a statement is true for every number in a set.120
One way to visualize the concept underlying induction is with ladders and stairs
in the following analogy:
[I]f you want to show that someone can climb to the nth floor of
a fire escape, you need only show that you can climb the ladder
up to the fire escape (n=1) and then show that you know how to
climb the stairs from any level of the fire escape (n=k) to the
next level (n=k+1).121
Like a direct proof, a proof by induction uses deductive reasoning to prove each
step.122 The difference between a direct proof and a proof by induction lies in
the fact that a proof by induction attempts to prove the truth of a whole set of

115. Katherine Korner & Vicky Neale, An Introduction to Proof by Contradiction, NRICH
(2011), https://nrich.maths.org/4717 [https://perma.cc/3WJD-93H5]; HAMMACK, supra note 82, at
112.
116. Korner & Neale, supra note 115.
117. Id.
118. HAMMACK, supra note 82, at 112.
119. Id. at 154.
120. Vicky Neale, An Introduction to Mathematical Induction, NRICH (2018),
https://nrich.maths.org/4718 [https://perma.cc/72BB-53TC].
121. Christina
Sormani,
Proofs
by
Induction,
CUNY,
http://comet.lehman.cuny.edu/sormani/teaching/induction.html [https://perma.cc/8Z42-8VES].
122. HAMMACK, supra note 82, at 154–55.
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statements, as opposed to a singular statement.123 The proof follows this
structure:
Proposition: The statements !# , !% , !& , !' , are all true.
Proof. (Induction)
(1) Prove that the first statement !# is true.
(2) Given any integer $ ≥ 1, prove that the statement !! Þ !!"# is true.
It follows by mathematical induction that every !$ is true. [QED.]
124

The first step is the base step, which is usually a simple statement that is easy
to prove.125 The second step is the inductive step, which uses direct proof to
demonstrate that !! through !!"# is true by assuming !! is true.126 In reaching
the conclusion, the proof demonstrates that !! through !!"# must be true and,
therefore, every !$ must also be true.127
These three proof styles demonstrate the logical thinking a mathematician
uses every day. Each proof is a framework for approaching a problem and using
logic to solve the problem in a clear and straightforward manner. There is no
room for excess prose or unnecessary big words. In using a proof, a
mathematician explains the problem’s solution through systematic, clear
reasoning.
Ultimately, while mathematics is not easily defined, it can be understood as
a system of thought that seeks to solve problems through logical reasoning. The
applications of mathematical logic extend far beyond the realm of mathematical
number problems. An adept mathematician possesses strong logical reasoning,
understanding the structure of an idea such that they can develop principles that
remain true even if the structural components change.
V. INTEGRATING MATHEMATICAL THINKING AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
We might think that Abraham Lincoln attributed his rhetorical abilities to
the study of orators but, as mathematician Jordan Ellenberg notes, Lincoln gave
credit to Euclid:
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

HAMMACK, supra note 82, at 154–55.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
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In the course of my law-reading I constantly came upon the
word ‘demonstrate.’ I thought, at first, that I understood its
meaning, but soon became satisfied that I did not . . . . At last
I said, ‘Lincoln, you can never make a lawyer if you do not
understand what demonstrate means’; and I left my situation in
Springfield, went home to my father’s house, and stayed there
till I could give any propositions in the six books of Euclid at
sight.128
In studying Euclid, Lincoln developed his integrity because, Ellenberg asserts,
Lincoln believed that a person should be able to back up what they say—to be
able to demonstrate they are right.129
As Lincoln knew, while mathematics and law are distinct fields,
understanding the similarities and differences between the two fields
strengthens a lawyer’s ability to soundly reason and advocate effectively. Legal
reasoning and mathematical proofs can follow a parallel structure—for
example, legal reasoning uses deductive reasoning, counterargument, and
analogy, which correspond to direct proof, contradiction, and induction in math.
This type of reasoning underlies AI, which lawyers use in day-to-day tasks like
research on a platform like Westlaw or LexisNexis.130 While lawyers use these
platforms every day (and often many times a day), not as many understand the
underlying algorithms driving the platforms. In understanding mathematical
reasoning, lawyers can better use these tools.
In this Part, we describe how common tools of logic—deductive reasoning,
analogy, and counterargument—resemble mathematical forms. We then
describe the mathematical logic that underlies AI. Our goal is to bridge the gap
perceived between mathematical logic and legal reasoning. We recognize that
the two forms of logic are not exactly the same. As scholars such as Stephen
Toulmin have recognized, practical logic cannot be perfectly equated with
formal logic.131 And yet, mathematical algorithms are being used to build tools
that can analyze the law. We argue that this paradox is worth considering
128. Jordan Ellenberg, What Honest Abe Learned From Geometry, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2021)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Lincoln’s response in 1865 to Reverend J.P. Gulliver, who asked him to
artGEOMETRY OF INFORMATION, BIOLOGY, STRATEGY, DEMOCRACY, AND EVERYTHING ELSE
(2021)),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-honest-abe-learned-from-geometry-11621656062
[https://perma.cc/LJ6Q-CQ7S].
129. Id. (stating that “[i]n Euclid, Lincoln found a language in which it’s very hard to
dissimulate, cheat or dodge the question. Geometry is a form of honesty.”). Ellenberg recounts
Lincoln’s friend Henry Clay Whitney, who said of Lincoln: “It was morally impossible for Lincoln to
argue dishonestly; he could no more do it than he could steal; it was the same thing to him in essence,
to despoil a man of his property by larceny, or by illogical or flagitious reasoning.” Id.
130. See discussion infra Section V.C.
131. See generally TOULMIN, supra note 42.
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further as lawyers increasingly use AI tools in the practice of law and seek to
grow the practice of law even in the face of potential competition from these
tools.
A. Mathematics and Legal Reasoning Run Parallel
Law is a discipline that can be compared to mathematics, science,
philosophy, and rhetoric, but, of course, law is a unique discipline. No
discipline perfectly overlaps, certainly, but understanding and appreciating the
similarities, and potential differences, between mathematical thinking and legal
reasoning can aid a lawyer in becoming a stronger thinker and advocate. Legal
reasoning and mathematical proofs are parallel in structure. Legal reasoning
uses deductive reasoning, counterargument, and analogy, which correspond to
direct proof, contradiction, and induction in math.
Holmes correctly asserted that law and legal argument include more than
logical or mathematical assertions132 and, yet, by understanding the similar
structure of mathematical proofs and legal reasoning, a lawyer can articulate
arguments in a more cogent way to better communicate a legal position to
others.133 A more clearly articulated position is naturally more persuasive.
Such a position accounts for the strengths and weaknesses of the advocate’s
argument, as well as the other side’s best positions, which allows a judge or
jury to get to the bottom of each sides’ arguments and see a path to a favorable
conclusion. These same benefits apply when a lawyer needs to articulate
arguments to a client to assess the next strategic steps or in arguing a position
to opposing counsel in settlement negotiations.
This section demonstrates how deductive reasoning, analogy, and
counterargument in legal reasoning should be structured to effectively
communicate legal arguments. These forms parallel the natural structure of
mathematical proof. We recognize that the form of legal reasoning cannot be
exactly the same as a mathematical proof because the facts of a case are not
indisputably true, and laws change from one jurisdiction to another, or over
time, as policy rationales or customs shift the laws. Our point is that the
communication of those positions can be aided by structuring the argument to
mimic mathematical proof, and we offer some examples from the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States, which show how these
forms are used in legal reasoning.
132. Holmes, supra note 35, at 998.
133. Richard K. Neumann, Jr.’s textbook on legal analysis and writing convincingly connects
legal reasoning to mathematical proof. Neumann masterfully uses the term proof to exemplify how to
build legal analysis and reflect that analysis in writing. See RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL
REASONING & LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, & STYLE (Wolters Kluwer 6th ed. 2009).
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1. Deductive Reasoning
Parallels exist between the deductive reasoning used in legal analysis and a
direct mathematical proof. While the rules of law differ from the assumptions
of mathematical proof, these two formats conduct analysis in the same way. A
direct proof simply uses deductive reasoning. The key difference is the content
to which the deductive reasoning is being applied.
In deductive reasoning, legal analysis starts with a thesis stating a
conclusion.134 A legal writer must synthesize the various rules of law that
govern the issue.135 Commonly, this process results in what is often called a
rule synthesis paragraph,136 and that paragraph typically precedes the analysis
of how those rules apply to the facts. Rules can be stated expressly in the
precedent or legal authorities being cited, or they can be implied from the
analysis of a precedent decision.137 The legal standards are similar to the major
premise in a syllogism, although the parties might argue about what the rules
are, or should be, and the rules can vary from one jurisdiction to another.138 To
that extent, rules of law differ from the major premise in mathematical proofs,
but they are conveyed in the same way for the purpose of clear communication.
The conclusion thesis states the overall conclusion that results from the
application of the various rules stated in the synthesis to the particular facts of
the case.139 This conclusion is the probative point the lawyer is making in the
argument, or the court’s overall decision, and would be like the “q” in the
mathematical proof. The lawyer or judge must shore up the facts that support
the conclusion, but then address the facts that do not support the conclusion in
addressing counterarguments.140 The deduction is more effective the more
particularly the facts are stated with concrete details. An advocate does not

134. Deductive reasoning is also referred to as rule-based reasoning. JOAN M. ROCKLIN,
ROBERT B. ROCKLIN, CHRISTINE COUGHLIN & SANDY PATRICK, AN ADVOCATE PERSUADES 131
(2016) (outlining the structure starting with a conclusion).
135. E.g., DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING,
REASONING, & WRITING 44–45 (3d ed. 2007) (describing the process). Mary Beth Beazley describes
the importance of finding the “key terms” in the rule, which she calls the “the phrases-that-pay.” MARY
BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY, 68–71 (4th ed. 2014).
136. NEUMANN, supra note 133, at 155–56. See generally Michael D. Murray, Rule Synthesis
and Explanatory Synthesis: A Socratic Dialogue Between IREAC And TREAT, 8 LEGAL COMMC’N &
RHETORIC: JAWLD, 217, 223 (2011).
137. RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & SHEILA SIMON, LEGAL WRITING 33 (2008).
138. BEAZLEY, supra note 135, at 93.
139. ROCKLIN, ROCKLIN, COUGHLIN & PATRICK, supra note 134, at 131–32.
140. Id. at 132. Wilson Huhn notes that a case may present more than one syllogism, or even
many syllogisms. Wilson Huhn, The Use and Limits of Syllogistic Reasoning in Briefing Cases, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 813, 835–36 n.99 (discussing Aldisert’s polysyllogistic model of legal
reasoning).
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need to restate the rules but should apply them directly to the facts of a case.
The conclusion is then restated at the end.
Take, for example, Carpenter v. United States, where the Court advanced
its own argument through a rule statement in support of its conclusion.141 In
Section IIIA of the Court’s opinion, the following rule statement advanced the
Court’s conclusion that a warrant is required for the government to obtain cell
phone tower records:
A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection
by venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, “what
[one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.” A majority of
this Court has already recognized that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical
movements. Prior to the digital age, law enforcement might
have pursued a suspect for a brief stretch, but doing so “for any
extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore
rarely undertaken.” For that reason, “society’s expectation has
been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and
indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a
very long period.”142
These sentences represent fundamental standards of constitutional criminal
investigation. The Court set out these standards in the first paragraph of Section
A to establish the ground rules for the discussion and application of those
standards. In these sentences, we can see a general standard of expectation of
privacy, supported by sub-rules, or supporting legal standards, in the remaining
sentences that further describe or delineate the main standard in the first
sentence.
In the beginning of the next paragraph, the Court applied these standards to
the facts in Carpenter’s case:
Allowing government access to cell-site records contravenes
that expectation. Although such records are generated for
commercial purposes, that distinction does not negate
Carpenter’s anticipation of privacy in his physical location.
Mapping a cell phone’s location over the course of 127 days
provides an all-encompassing record of the holder’s
whereabouts.143

141. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
142. Id. (internal citations omitted).
143. Id.
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In the first sentence, the Court articulated its conclusion that cell phone
tower records carry an expectation of privacy that is violated when the
government accesses the records without a warrant to determine a person’s
physical location.144 Notably, the Court articulated a broad conclusion in the
first sentence that affirmatively applies to future cases and then stated the
specific application to Carpenter’s case in the next sentence.145 The Court’s
reasoning applied the sub-rules from the previous paragraph where it asserted
that mapping a person’s location over an extended period of time creates a
record that is all-encompassing.146
In a direct mathematical proof, the hypothesis and conclusion are known to
be true because each part of the proof is true. We can think of a direct proof as
an old-school two column geometry proof, where each line is assumed to be
true and has been proven in a previous theorem. In legal reasoning, the legal
standards articulated are supported by citations, although each standard could
potentially be changed over time as the precedent unfolds. The facts in an
appellate decision are considered true for the purposes of the appeal because
they are limited to those facts provided in the record, which “must be accepted
as true.”147 At the trial level, each side is allowed to proffer evidence that
supports a version of the factual story.148 Ultimately, however, a jury must
decide the “truth” of the facts and apply the legal standards agreed upon by the
parties and the court in the jury instructions.149 The jury instructions act as a
major premise, and the jury must fill in the factual assertions.
As such, the legal standards or rules articulated first are the givens that
create the field of analysis when a court (or jury) considers the facts of the case.
In a trial or traditional court of appeals case, those givens have been asserted in
a prior appellate decision. In a case before the United States Supreme Court or
a state supreme court, the court can consider the logical extension or
modification of the law based on a new set of facts. Even in those cases, as
exemplified in the Carpenter case, the court must first consider the “given” set
of rules that were laid out in previous cases by the majority of the court.

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Adam N. Steinman, The Rise and Fall of Plausibility Pleading?, 69 VAND. L. REV.
333, 358 (2016).
148. See
Trial
Court,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Trial_court
[https://perma.cc/MQ98-Y5TW].
149. Courts and Legal Procedure: The Role of Juries, A.B.A. (Sept. 09, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/ho
w_courts_work/jury_role/. [https://perma.cc/X46E-A8YE].
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As noted in Part IIA of this Article, both ancient and modern philosophers
and rhetoricians have expressed concern over the possibility of conflating
mathematical reasoning with human argumentation. Philosopher Stephen
Toulmin’s work on the logic of human argumentation is worth noting as we
discuss deductive reasoning because Toulmin raises concerns about the use of
syllogisms. Stephen Toulmin argues that syllogisms are insufficient for
practical argumentation, including legal argumentation.150 Toulmin viewed
syllogisms as overly simple logic forms, and he was also concerned that formal
analytics is too rigid for the nature of human argumentation.151 To address
these concerns, Toulmin identified additional components of practical
arguments.152 He argued that a practical argument uses additional structural
components not found in a syllogism as used in formal analytics, and that these
additional components correlate more practically with human
argumentation.153 Notably, he identified the warrant, which he defined as a
step to explain how to get from the data to the conclusion.154 The warrant, and
Toulmin’s other parts of an argument, make sense in the context of human
argumentation and, in particular, legal argumentation. We do not disagree with
Toulmin. Our purpose here, however, is two-fold: 1) to remind ourselves that
parallels exist in the structure of mathematical reasoning and legal deduction,
and 2) to consider how those similarities are being used to create algorithms
that have real-world applications.
Chaïm Perelman also rightly expressed a distinction between the use of
mathematics to demonstrate the truth of a statement, versus the adherence to an
argument that an advocate seeks in a human argument.155 We similarly do not
seek to clarify or oppose Perelman’s position that mathematics and legal
reasoning are fundamentally different—mathematics seeks to demonstrate a
truth while legal reasoning seeks to argue a point.156 Rather, we recognize

150. TOULMIN, supra note 42, at 100 (“[W]e shall find that the apparently innocent forms used
in syllogistic arguments turn out to have a hidden complexity.”).
151. Id. at 117 (“If the purpose of an argument is to establish conclusions about which we are
not entirely confident by relating them back to other information about which we have greater
assurance, it begins to be a little doubtful whether any genuine, practical argument could ever be
properly analytic.”) (emphasis in original).
152. See id. at 87–134 (identifying and describing an argument’s various components).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 90–91.
155. CHAÏM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC 48 (1982) (translation of original published
as L’EMPIRE RHÉTORIQUE: RHÉTORIQUE ET ARGUMENTATION) (“There is a tendency among
formalistic logicians to reduce all deductive reasoning to a demonstration which would be correct if
the operations agreed with a pre-established scheme and incorrect if they did not.”).
156. Id.
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deductive reasoning’s basic organizational structures have been adopted—and
adapted—to suit the needs of advocates.
2. Counterargument
In legal reasoning, a lawyer must account for counterarguments.157 One of
the challenges of good lawyering is to identify the other side’s best arguments,
to acknowledge those arguments to oneself—considering them and assessing
how best to respond to them—and then to craft the response.158 This process
can invoke fear in the heart of an advocate facing the other side’s best
arguments, but it also provides a lawyer with a uniquely satisfying challenge.
An attorney must be able to convey the other side’s best arguments to the client,
so that together they can most effectively consider the next steps in a case and
assess the costs and benefits of strategic decisions. Properly assessing
counterarguments helps an attorney and a judge to understand the greatest point
of tension in a controversy.159
Counterarguments in legal reasoning are akin to mathematical
contradiction. A legal counterargument might be premised on a different
interpretation of the relevance of certain facts to the argument, or how best to
apply the holding or legal standards of a case. A counterargument may be based
on deductive reasoning or analogy. Like a proof by contradiction, an advocate
must start by identifying the counterargument. An advocate must also fill in
the reasoning that could potentially support the counterargument. The
argument must be built up, so it can be knocked down, either by showing that
the legal standards do not apply in that way to the facts of the case, or that a
case precedent can be distinguished. As such, an advocate can demonstrate that
an opposite position creates a result that conflicts with the original assumption,
the law.
To illustrate, in Carpenter, the government asserted that the third-party
doctrine applied to the cell phone record information.160 Under the third-party
doctrine, which is an exception to the warrant requirement, a warrant is not
needed to access information that is used commercially and, therefore, is
already in the public sphere.161 The government pointed to the Court’s prior
157. KRISTIN KONRAD ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS AND PERSUASION 196 (2009) (identifying two forms of counterargument:
denial of the allegation and a superseding argument that negates liability even if the assertion is
proved).
158. Id. at 197–201 (describing how to factor in a counterargument persuasively). RobbinsTiscione discusses the importance of “diminish[ing] the impact” of a counterargument. Id. at 200.
159. Id. at 201 (an advocate needs to present a counterargument and response to highlight which
argument is “most fair”).
160. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
161. Id.
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decisions in Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller to support its
argument, as noted by the Court:
The Government’s primary contention to the contrary is that
the third-party doctrine governs this case. In its view, cell-site
records are fair game because they are “business records”
created and maintained by the wireless carriers. The
Government (along with Justice Kennedy) recognizes that this
case features new technology, but asserts that the legal
question nonetheless turns on a garden-variety request for
information from a third-party witness.162
Here, the Court identified the counterargument, as well as the government’s
reasoning in support of the counterargument. But the Court found that line of
reasoning unpersuasive:
The Government’s position fails to contend with the seismic
shifts in digital technology that made possible the tracking of
not only Carpenter’s location but also everyone else’s, not for
a short period but for years and years. Sprint Corporation and
its competitors are not your typical witnesses. Unlike the nosy
neighbor who keeps an eye on comings and goings, they are
ever alert, and their memory is nearly infallible. There is a
world of difference between the limited types of personal
information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive
chronicle of location information casually collected by
wireless carriers today. The Government thus is not asking for
a straightforward application of the third-party doctrine, but
instead a significant extension of it to a distinct category of
information.163
Counterarguments allow the parties and the court to fully develop the strengths
and weaknesses of the arguments to find the locus or central point of
controversy.
3. Analogy
An important form of argument in legal reasoning is the analogy.164 An
analogy allows an advocate or judge to compare the current case to previous

162. Id. (internal citations omitted).
163. Id.
164. Jacob Carpenter, Persuading with Precedent: Understanding and Improving Analogies in
Legal Argument, 44 CAP. UNIV. L. REV. 461, 465 (2016). Ruggero Aldisert asserts that he finds it
convenient to classify analogy as a form of inductive reasoning but notes that not all scholars of logic
would agree. Ruggero Aldisert, Logic in Forensic Science, in FORENSIC SCIENCE AND LAW:
INVESTIGATIVE APPLICATIONS IN CRIMINAL, CIVIL AND FAMILY JUSTICE 11, 23 (Cyril H. Wecht &
John T. Rago eds., 2006).
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case law.165 The best way to do that is to consider the facts, holding, and
reasoning of the precedent and how those components line up with the present
case.166 An analogy considers the similarities and differences between the
precedent and the current case and how that comparison furthers the conclusion
being driven.167 Analogies can be used to further the argument being presented
in a case or to help a court understand three-dimensionally how the rules have
worked in prior precedent.168
For example, in the Carpenter decision, the Court had to address a
significant counterargument based on existing case precedent, and it handled
the counterargument by responding with an analogy.169 An exception to the
warrant requirement exists for commercial records.170
The Court
acknowledged that exception where it used the phrase “[a]lthough such records
are generated for commercial purposes.”171 The Court prefaced that sentence
with the word “although,” which is a signpost for the introduction of a
counterargument.172 The Court went on to respond to the counterargument,
noting that such a “distinction does not negate Carpenter’s anticipation of
privacy in his physical location.”173 The Court found more persuasive that the
long-term mapping of Carpenter’s physical location provides an “allencompassing record” of his physical location.174 The Court supported its
position with an analogy to GPS monitoring and information, a fact pattern it
had already addressed in United States v. Jones:
As with GPS information, the time-stamped data provides an
intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his
particular movements, but through them his “familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.” These
location records “hold for many Americans the ‘privacies of
life.’” And like GPS monitoring, cell phone tracking is
remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional
165. Carpenter, supra note 164, at 486–87.
166. ROCKLIN, ROCKLIN, COUGHLIN & PATRICK, supra note 134, at 127.
167. Id. See also RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL
THINKING 51–52 (3d ed. 1997) (emphasizing the importance of the relevancy of the analogy to the
overall argument).
168. MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY DESANCTIS, OBJECTIVE LEGAL WRITING & ANALYSIS
10 (2006). See also Brian Larson, Law’s Enterprise: Argumentation Schemes & Legal Analogy, 87
UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 663, 672 (2019) (quoting the work of Neil MacCormick) (describing analogy as
most often used for classification and evaluation).
169. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
170. Id.
171. Id. See supra Section V.A.1.
172. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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investigative tools. With just the click of a button, the
Government can access each carrier’s deep repository of
historical location information at practically no expense.175
Here, the Court was able to demonstrate that factually the information
gleaned from cell phone tower records would provide the same kind of intimate
details about a person’s life and personal associations as can be determined
from GPS data.176 Because the Court had already ruled that GPS data was
protected by meeting the standard for protecting the privacies of life, the Court
extended that rationale to cell phone tower data.177
The Court then moved on to explain that the facts in the Carpenter case are
an even better example than Jones of the application of the principle of
protecting a person’s expectation of privacy:
In fact, historical cell-site records present even greater privacy
concerns than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle we considered
in Jones. Unlike the bugged container in Knotts or the car in
Jones, a cell phone—almost a “feature of human anatomy,”––
tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner. While
individuals regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively
carry cell phones with them all the time. A cell phone
faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and
into private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters,
and other potentially revealing locales. Accordingly, when the
Government tracks the location of a cell phone it achieves near
perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to
the phone’s user.178
Just as in induction, the Court here was showing that both cases are true;
indeed, Carpenter’s case perhaps even better illustrates the principle than Jones.
As such, the Court in Carpenter could demonstrate that the cell phone, in
addition to (and even more so) than a car, leaves traces of our private lives
through location information.179 These examples in Carpenter and Jones serve
to validate and define by example the generic “black letter law” of a person’s
expectation of privacy.
Crafting a perceptive and persuasive analogy is an especially challenging
endeavor. For one, an advocate must choose what is legally relevant to

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 2217–18 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2218 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
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compare.180 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue that analogies do not share
the same characteristics with mathematical proportion.181 In this, they disagree
with other scholars, who have found analogies to show a “resemblance of
relationship” with “the purest type of analogy” being in “mathematical
proportion.”182 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have a more nuanced view of
analogies. They focus on the “difference between the relations involved” in the
analogy.183 They call the terms that buttress the argument the phoros.184 They
call the terms that relate to the conclusion the theme.185 The phoros and the
theme should have an asymmetrical relation and they should also belong to
different spheres.186 For that reason, they seem to conclude, an analogy cannot
be mathematical.187 This example from The New Rhetoric is provided here to
emphasize the importance of considering the terms being compared. While a
lawyer cannot compare two cases with exact mathematical precision, because
no facts line up just right, we can aim to set up an argument to emphasize the
right similarities and differences.
While analogies are common place in legal thinking and writing, RobbinsTiscione identifies three main problems with analogies.188 One problem occurs
when critical information is left out of the cases being compared.189 Another
problem can be the reliance on a case with an adverse outcome.190 Finally,
analogies that address multiple factors must address “relevant or unfavorable

180. ROBBINS-TISCIONE, supra note 157, at 173 (“The success of an analogy depends on how
strong the reader perceives the factual similarities between the two cases and whether any differences
strike the reader as even more significant.”).
181. PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 24, at 372–73.
182. Id. at 372 (emphasis omitted) (translating PAUL GRENET, LES ORIGINS DE L’ANALOGIE
PHILOSPHIQUE DANS LES DIALOGUES DE PLATON 10 (1948)).
183. Id. at 373. The New Rhetoric gives an example of an analogy used by Aristotle: “For as
the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature
most evident of all.” Id.(quoting ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS bk. II, at Part I (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford
Press) (c. 350 B.C.E.))
184. Id. In the preceding analogy given by Aristotle, the eyes and bats and the blaze of day
together provide the terms for the phoros. Id.
185. Id. In Aristotle’s analogy, the theme is comprised of the terms reason in the soul and
obviousness. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. ROBBINS-TISCIONE, supra note 157, at 174–78.
189. Id. at 174–75 (stating that the court’s reasoning, facts, and holding need to be compared for
a complete analogy).
190. Id. at 174 (an advocate needs to acknowledge an adverse outcome so the reader can evaluate
the importance of the case).
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factors” so the reader can see the interplay of the factors.191 In short, a
successful analogy relies on the strength of the details being compared.192
As we have demonstrated here, lawyers use deductive reasoning, analogy,
and counterargument routinely in their arguments. We can see the parallels to
mathematical reasoning. While scholars have argued they are not the same
forms of reasoning, and that legal argumentation is more complicated that
mathematical forms, they do share similarities. It is time to leave the notion
that mathematics cannot inform law. We can recognize that they are distinct
disciplines, each bringing value to the scholarly table. But we should recognize
the basic similarities. Recognizing those similarities, and actively embracing
knowledge of mathematics, can sharpen our reasoning and allow us to see
patterns of thought. Moreover, as we discuss in the next section, mathematics
underlies the very tools of AI that lawyers are already using. That seems like a
paradox, and we encourage both lawyers and mathematicians to engage in
discussion to tease out an answer to that paradox. Doing so will not only further
our understanding of practical legal logic, but it will help lawyers and
developers of technological products to see the possibilities in collaboration.
B. The Mathematics in AI
When we think of AI, in 2022, the time of this Article’s publication, we are
most likely to think of services like Alexa or Siri, which can use voice
commands to retrieve information or do simple tasks in the home or on a
person’s computer. But what is AI? What mathematics underlies AI? And
how is it currently used in the law? Members of the legal profession might
know that platforms like Westlaw and LexisNexis use AI. In using the
platforms, we are not conscious of the underlying algorithms that drive the
functionality, but we know that we can do more complex tasks more easily.
Simply put, mathematics and AI are two branches of the same tree. In fact,
mathematics fuels AI through disciplines such as linear algebra, calculus, and
statistics.193 At times, the fields collapse into one another as if they are the same
field, and at other times the fields feel wholly distinct with their own language,
goals, and methodologies. This section provides a brief overview of the
relationship between mathematics and AI to demonstrate the connections the
two fields share.

191. Id. at 176–78. Robbins-Tiscione notes that an attorney cannot “cherry-pick” relevant
factors. Id. at 178.
192. RUGGERO ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT 262
(2d ed. 2003) (An analogy depends on the “quality of resemblances between things.”).
193. Shafi, supra note 12.
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AI is the convergence of computers, math, and data.194 AI, like other
scientific fields, requires mathematical thinking and, in fact, mathematics
serves as the major designing tool that shapes the field.195 More explicitly, AI
is “a subcategory of computer science that relies on mathematics, including
calculus, probability and statistics, linear programming, and other numerical
techniques.”196 But to boil it down to its most simple form, AI is really just
mathematics conducted on an enormous scale.197
Mathematical logic underlies AI software and expert systems.198 AI relies
upon logic programming to develop expert systems.199 For example, logical AI
programs will use sentences of mathematical logical language to represent a
problem through given facts about the world and a scenario and the desired goal
for the program to reach.200 “In order to make decisions, a logical AI program
infers that certain actions will allow it to achieve a goal.”201 Through this
process, logic programs rely upon mathematical logic including proofs in group
theory and other parts of mathematics.202 From this standpoint then, AI can be
viewed as “mechanized mathematical logic.”203
Three key mathematical concepts that underly machine learning, and thus
AI, are data, models, and learning.204 Data is the numerical input for the
program to consider or the numerical output for the program to generate, often
described in the form of a vector.205 A model generates data by predicting what

194. Joe Sasson, Demystifying Artificial Intelligence, MEDIUM (June 18, 2021),
https://medium.com/geekculture/demystifying-artificial-intelligence-bdd9a117d4a6
[https://perma.cc/95QC-MVQX].
195. BENDER supra note 96, at xv.
196. Rachel L. Schwein, Patentability and Inventorship of AI Generated Inventions, 60 WASH
L.J.
561,
566
(2020),
https://www.washburnlaw.edu/publications/wlj/issues/60-3.html
[https://perma.cc/9EAF-Q2ZA].
197. Shafi, supra note 12; Oren Etzioni, Deep Learning Isn’t a Dangerous Magic Genie: It’s
Just Math, WIRED (June 15, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/deep-learning-isntdangerous-magic-genie-just-math/ [https://perma.cc/A7EL-NAUL].
198. Frederick Hoffman Introduction and History, in 55 PROCEEDINGS OF SYMPOSIA IN APPLIED
MATHEMATICS: MATHEMATICAL ASPECTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1, 3 (Frederick Hoffman ed.,
1996).
199. Id.
200. Schwein, supra note 196, at 568 n.60.
201. Id.
202. Hoffman, supra note 198, at 3–4.
203. Id. at 3.
204. MARC PETER DEISENROTH, A. ALDO FAISAL & CHENG SOON ONG, MATHEMATICS FOR
MACHINE LEARNING 12 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2020), https://mml-book.github.io/book/mmlbook.pdf. [https://perma.cc/75EG-JEDP].
205. Id.
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would happen in the real world without performing real world experiments.206
Finally, learning is the process in which the model is trained to use the available
data to optimize model parameters so that the model can successfully perform
on unseen data.207 These concepts follow the generalized goals of applied
mathematics: to apply mathematics to real-world problems to explain observed
phenomena and predict new phenomena.208
While mathematics and AI are distinct fields, the two fields share the same
logical basis to approach real world problems. Each field uses logical reasoning
in different ways to achieve entirely distinct results, but the core logical
structure remains the same.
C. Embracing Mathematics and AI in Law
Lawyers are already harnessing the power of AI in their day-to-day work.209
In using databases such as Westlaw and Lexis, for instance, lawyers are now
trained in how to effectively use a search engine. What a lot of lawyers don’t
know is the workings of AI, which are happening in the background through
search optimization. Further, lawyers have started to use newer technology
such as draft assistant. AI is being used in six areas of legal practice: (1)
electronic discovery, (2) “expertise automation,” (3) research, (4) document
management, (5) document creation and analytics for contracts and litigation,
and (6) predictive analytics.210

206. Id.
207. Id. at 12–13. See also PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUESTION
FOR THE ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 8 (2015) (describing machine
learning as a subset of AI).
208. What
is
Applied
Mathematics?,
N W.
UNIV.
SCH.
OF
ENG’G,
https://www.mccormick.northwestern.edu/applied-math/about/what-is-applied-mathematics.html
[https://perma.cc/H4JG-TKZQ].
209. Westlaw promises faster research with the use of AI-powered tools. In using “state-of theart” AI, Westlaw “provides attorneys with the fastest answers and most valuable insights via the next
generation of legal search, intelligent document analysis, integrated ligation analytics, and the most
powerful citator.” Westlaw Edge, THOMSON REUTERS, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/c/legalresearch-westlaw-edge?searchid=TRPPCSOL/Google/LegalUS_RS_Westlaw_Main_Search_BrandPhrase_US/Westlaw-Phrase&chl=ppc&cid=9029030&sfdccampaignid=7014O000001BRReQAO&
ef_id=Cj0KCQiAkZKNBhDiARIsAPsk0WjW1Z8pjATDB7Uju9dN3P8QREvrJ1OvZo9mnZsHz5Nc496RJY0-soaAsekEALw_wcB:G:s&s_kwcid=AL!7944!3!417749241023!p!!g!!westlaw&
gclid=Cj0KCQiAkZKNBhDiARIsAPsk0WjW1Z8pjATDB7Uju9dN3P8QREvrJ1OvZo9mnZsHz5Nc496RJY0-soaAsekEALw_wcB [https://perma.cc/PH3J-JW8T].
210. Anthony E. Davis, The Future of Law Firms (And Lawyers) in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence,
27
THE
PRO.
LAW.
1
(2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/professional_lawyer/27
/1/the-future-law-firms-and-lawyers-the-age-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/9K8N-NEHT].
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Electronic discovery tools are widely used. These tools greatly reduce the
amount of time and cost required to review discovery documents and produce
results with greater accuracy.211 AI first appeared in legal practice in electronic
discovery.212 These products use a concept called “conceptual searching” or
“conceptual clustering” to search for relevant words as the tool reads the
documents and then cluster the resulting information and documents.213 The
resulting data is provided visually in, for instance, a pie chart.214 A person
conducting the discovery needs to work with the algorithm and review the
documents.215 In other words, a human must synthesize and review the data,
although the AI can narrow the field significantly.216
The concept of expertise automation refers to the ability of a lawyer or nonlawyer to use AI tools to engage with the law or mimic the role of a lawyer.217
Examples of these products include Blue J, where a person using the product
can assess issues of tax or employment law in a particular jurisdiction and input
key facts of the matter at hand.218 DoNotPay is a program that assists a person
in contesting parking tickets anywhere in the U.S.219 AI can assist a person in
drafting wills or addressing housing issues.220
Today, lawyers conduct the majority of their research online.221 Legal
research has developed dramatically since the 1990s from the traditional library
models to almost entirely digital platforms.222 Search engines that lawyers use
to conduct research rely upon AI. Westlaw and LexisNexis have both large
databases and AI functions, which again allow a person conducting a search to
efficiently comb sources, thereby again saving time and money for a client.223
211. Id.; Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in E-Discovery and Beyond, DELOITTE,
https://www2.deloitte.com/ch/en/pages/forensics/articles/AI-and-machine-learning-in-Ediscovery.html [https://perma.cc/24B8-N4WY] (noting that legal professionals save 40% of hours
typically needed to complete task).
212. Davis, supra note 210.
213. DELOITTE, supra note 211.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Davis, supra note 210.
218. Id.; BLUE J, supra note 9.
219. Davis, supra note 210; DONOTPAY, https://donotpay.com/learn/parking-tickets
[https://perma.cc/SE53-EDKQ].
220. Davis, supra note 210.
221. Nicole Black, ABA Report: Lawyers and Technology Trends in 2021, ABOVE THE LAW
(Aug. 26, 2021, 11:43 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2021/08/aba-report-lawyers-and-technologytrends-in-2021/ [https://perma.cc/J2CM-QS8P].
222. Alarie, Niblet & Yoon, supra note 8, at 112.
223. Davis, supra note 210.
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Westlaw Edge and LexisNexis use AI to enable users to search using natural
language processing.224 Even in conducting a simple Google search, a lawyer
is inputting different variables and conditions and relying on the search engine
to “rank” the results according to relevance.225 In doing so, the lawyer is relying
on AI and deep learning algorithms that continually optimize a lawyer’s
searching ability.226
Corporations use document management tools to create consistency and to
enforce the contracts across all the contracts in the organization.227 These tools
can reduce time by thousands of hours.228 AI is also being used to create
contracts and litigation documents consistent with precedent.229
One form of predictive analytics allows a person to assess the likelihood of
a judge rendering a particular decision on an issue based on the judge’s past
ruling on the same type of issue.230 Lex Machina and Lex Predict are such
examples.231 Premonition can predict whether a particular lawyer will have
success in front of a certain judge.232 Another form of predictive analytics
assists a lawyer in determining whether any key precedents have been excluded
from a brief.233
This brief survey highlights the current functionality of AI in the legal
profession.234 We emphasize that these products are sophisticated tools, but
they are just tools, nonetheless. In some instances, the tool can replace an
attorney for a task for which, perhaps, a non-lawyer would have already
declined representation, such as to contest a parking ticket or deal with a
housing matter. As the complexity increases, however, lawyers must actively
understand how to use and interpret the tools guided by AI. To do otherwise is

224. Michael Mills, Artificial Intelligence in Law: The State of Play 2016, THOMPSON REUTERS
LEGAL EXEC. INST. (2016), https://britishlegalitforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/KeynoteMills-AI-in-Law-State-of-Play-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8W7-BBQ4].
225. Davide Negrini, Andrea Padoan & Mario Plebani, Between Web Search Engines and
Artificial Intelligence: What Side is Shown in Laboratory Tests?, 8 DIAGNOSIS 227, 228 (2020).
226. Id.
227. Davis, supra note 210.
228. Id. (citing Hugh Son, JPMorgan Software Does in Seconds What Took Lawyers 360,000
Hours, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2017)), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0228/jpmorgan-marshals-an-army-of-developers-to-automate-high-finance
[https://perma.cc/EY9X4RAE]).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Mills, supra note 224.
232. Id.
233. Davis, supra note 210.
234. For further detailed reading, see KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL
ANALYTICS: NEW TOOLS FOR LAW PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2017).
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professional incompetence and might result in malpractice or professional
responsibility issues.235 The tool does not replace the lawyer.
Cass Sunstein has argued that AI cannot replace legal reasoning.236 We
agree. But lawyers need to understand the interplay, the point of connection,
between their reasoning and the algorithms. Where do the results of the
algorithmic programs end and their own strategy and understanding of the
complexity of the law as applied to their client’s situation begin? How can they
use their human reasoning and skill to oversee the tools they are using?
Lawyers can use the metaphor of mathematics as an analog to legal reasoning
to help themselves, and their clients, understand what they as attorneys offer.
Lawyers need the metaphor to grasp their professional responsibilities in a
world where pen and paper are supplemented, and sometimes supplanted, by
code and computer.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
We need to move past our discomfort with mathematics. For one thing,
lawyers’ discomfort with mathematics is leading to meritless lawsuits and
unwarranted litigation.237 In dismissing a case over a three-week lapse in blood
pressure medication, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals chastised the judges
and lawyers involved in the case for failing to support adequate medical
evidence to support the inmate’s claimed symptoms.238 In his opinion, Judge
Posner observed that “[t]he discomfort of the legal profession, including the
judiciary, with science and technology is not a new phenomenon . . . [b]ut it’s
increasingly concerning, because of the extraordinary rate of scientific and
other technological advances that figure increasingly in litigation.”239

235. Victoria Hudgins, Lawyers Run into Legal, Ethical Risks Using—and Not Using—AI
Technology,
LEGALTECH
NEWS
(Oct.
14,
2021,
11:30
AM),
https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2021/10/14/lawyers-run-into-legal-ethical-risks-using-and-notusing-ai-technology/ [https://perma.cc/33VB-4E64].
236. Cass R. Sunstein, Of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 8 UNIV. OF CHI.
ROUNDTABLE 29, 31 (2001), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1237
6&context=journal_articles [https://perma.cc/8DVR-7SFN].
237. Debra Cassens Weiss, Posner: Lawyers Bad at Math are an Increasing Concern; Inmate’s
Blood-Pressure Suit Shows Why, A.B.A. JOURNAL (Oct. 29, 2013, 12:51 PM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/posner_math_block_lawyers_an_increasing_concern_inma
tes_blood-pressure_suit [https://perma.cc/9THP-MCR9]; Should Lawyers Learn to Code?, THE
TEMPLE
10-Q,
https://www2.law.temple.edu/10q/should-lawyers-learn-to-code/
[https://perma.cc/S8FS-BDSH] (arguing for the need of lawyers competent in STEM fields as “[t]here
is a long list of examples of questionable policies, legislation, and rulemaking in law and technology
that can also be traced to these fundamental misunderstandings”).
238. Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 787–88 (7th Cir. 2013).
239. Id. at 788.
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Specifically, Judge Posner focused on the fact that innumerable lawyers
pursued the law instead of STEM due to a “math block” and generally law
students display a peculiarly adverse reaction to math and science.240
For another thing, and more importantly, AI is demonstrating that
mathematics and law do co-exist in harmony. While mathematics and law are
distinct disciplines, mathematical algorithms are being used to create faster
research tools and even predictive analysis. Lawyers should not ignore that
connection. While human lawyering requires more than research and analysis
of legal standards, lawyers should not shy away from understanding the
mathematics underlying the tools we will increasingly use.241 Lawyers should
also see an analog between mathematical thinking and legal reasoning,
including that mathematics is syntactic.242 We must therefore continue to
sharpen our abilities to think logically and formulate logical arguments. Using
good logic is fundamental to lawyering, but it is not the only criteria for good
lawyering.
We recommend that law schools promote legal education to mathematics
students. In doing so, law schools should discuss how mathematical reasoning
parallels legal reasoning. The legal profession would gain diversity of thought
by bringing in more students who have studied mathematics. Those students
do not need to consider solely intellectual property areas of law: their skills
would benefit all practice areas. Additionally, undergraduate institutions
should actively promote that idea to prelaw students that they should be taking
classes in logic and mathematics.

240. Id. (citing DAVID L. FAIGMAN, MICHAEL SAKS, JOSEPH SANDERS & EDWARD CHENG,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: STANDARDS, STATISTICS, AND RESEARCH METHODS, at v (Student
ed. 2008)).
241. There is an ongoing debate in the mathematical community surrounding Gödel’s
incompleteness theorems as they relate to the essential question of what makes us human. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 65, at 201–03. In understanding this debate, lawyers can improve upon the human aspect
of legal practice.
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems provide that “[i]n any formal system adequate for number
theory there exists an undecidable formula—that is, a formula that is not provable and whose negation
is not provable,” and that “the consistency of a formal system adequate for number theory cannot be
proved within the system.” Id. at 23. These theorems have raised the debate of whether humans are
machines or whether “there must be more to human thinking than can ever be achieved by a computer,
in the sense that we understand the term ‘computer’ today.” Id. at 201–03 (quoting ROGER PENROSE,
SHADOWS OF THE MIND: A SEARCH FOR THE MISSING SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 65 (1994)).
This debate is mirky and complicated. As a practical takeaway, this debate highlights the
importance of lawyers’ ability to reason logically, to “think like a machine,” and to draw upon rhetoric,
to get at the heart of what makes us human. While we may never know exactly what makes us human,
rhetoric requires us to draw upon customs, policy, and sound judgment.
242. Id. at 100 (noting that “[m]athematics, like logic, is syntactic”).

LOVE KOENIG & MANDELL_27APR22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

600

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:559

Specifically, law students and lawyers should seek to increase their
understanding of numeracy, their “ability to understand and use numbers.”243
Numeracy both demonstrates the connection between legal thinking and
mathematical reasoning and reveals lawyers’ ability to think mathematically,
despite the pervasive view that lawyers are bad at math. An empirical study on
numeracy and legal decision making suggests that mathematical thinking
impacts a lawyer’s ability to conduct substantive legal analysis.244 Its findings
demonstrate the need to think of mathematical reasoning beyond mere
arithmetic, and instead to encompass decisions that include the ability to
evaluate probabilities, risks, or calculations.245
We further recommend that law school classes discuss logic in classroom
dialogue and exercises to sharpen students’ legal reasoning. The logic games
portion of the LSAT should not be the last or only time students are exposed to
logic. Students should understand and be able to identify logical fallacies and
know how to argue against them.246 They should know how to appropriately
set up arguments based on deductive reasoning, analogy, and counterargument.
To foster this learning, students should be exposed to the works of philosophers
and rhetoricians who have considered the relationship between logic, rhetoric,
and legal argument.
Moreover, students should understand the tools of legal research, analysis,
and drafting available on the market. Not only should they be aware that they
exist and how to use them, but they should have some understanding of how AI
drives the tools. That understanding will be increasingly important as a matter
of professional competency. Attorneys will need to understand how the tools
work so they can see gaps in the research and analysis. The AI tools should be
a starting point, not necessarily an ending point.
While this philosophical and mathematical debate is important, the practical
matter for lawyers is that AI has emerged in the practice of law. AI is the future
of the legal field, ready or not. While the legal field is usually slow to adapt to
changes, we, as lawyers, have a unique opportunity to embrace the rapid
changes that are coming and harness the power of AI. To do so, we need to
243. Rowell & Bregant, supra note 2, at 197. See also James Ming Chen, Legal Quanta: A
Mathematical Romance of Many Dimensions, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 313, 314 (2016) (“Innumeracy
is flatly unacceptable.”).
244. Rowell & Bregant, supra note 2, at 226.
245. Id.
246. In 2007, Ruggero Aldisert and two of his clerks wrote that they find it tragic that law schools
fail to teach logic. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Stephen Clowney & Jeremy D. Peterson, Logic for Law
Students: How to Think Like a Lawyer, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (“The failure to ground legal
education in principles of logic does violence to the essence of the law. Leaving students to distill the
principles of logic on their own is like asking them to design a rocket without teaching them the rules
of physics.”).

LOVE KOENIG & MANDELL_27APR22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

AI LINKS LEGAL REASONING & MATHEMATICAL THINKING

601

understand mathematical thinking. But understanding mathematical thinking
will serve us in more ways than just using AI—it will make us better thinkers,
writers, and overall better lawyers.

